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INTERNATIONAL CENTER
FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN

A large, abstract graphic consisting of two overlapping circles. The left circle is teal and the right circle is red. They overlap in the center, creating a dark, almost black area. The circles have a grainy, stippled texture, giving them a soft, ethereal appearance. The background is white with a subtle, fine-grained texture.

Gender Equality

IN FOREIGN POLICY

APRIL 2026

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Abbreviations

CEDAW

Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

FFP

Feminist Foreign Policy Index

GEFP

Gender Equality in Foreign Policy Index

ILO

International Labour Organization

ISDS

Investor–State Dispute Settlements

MIPEX

Migrant Integration Policy Index

NAPs

National Action Plans

NDCs

Nationally Determined Contributions

ODA

Official Development Assistance

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development

SIPRI

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

TIVs

Trend Indicator Values

Executive Summary

The 2026 Gender Equality in Foreign Policy (GEFP) Index launches at a markedly different political moment than its first iteration in 2023. Conflicts have deepened, the multilateral system has come under sustained strain, and the financing landscape has deteriorated sharply—including significant drops in Official Development Assistance (ODA) overall and in gender-targeted ODA specifically. This is precisely why an updated Index is needed now: not to retreat into a smaller or safer agenda, but to respond more pragmatically to the one in front of us.

The GEFP Index evaluates 57 countries across seven priority areas—peace and militarization, ODA, migration, labor protections, economic justice, institutional commitments, and climate governance—using quantitative indicators to make visible where structural integration of gender equality is strongest, where gaps persist, and where opportunities for reform exist. This iteration expands the 2023 Index (which was then called the Feminist Foreign Policy, or FFP, Index) to include nine additional countries, broadening geographic representation, particularly across the Global South. Across all seven domains, the central finding is consistent: the gap is not between countries that have made commitments and those that have not—it is between commitment and the institutional, financial, and political conditions needed to act on it.

Findings

Ratification of international disarmament frameworks is high, but formal endorsement has not translated into a shift away from militarized statecraft. Five countries have recently withdrawn from the Landmine Treaty, citing regional security concerns, and arms exports remain highly concentrated: a small number of states dominate global arms transfers while sustaining the highest levels of military expenditure, shaping global militarization far beyond their borders. On the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, only 18 countries have adopted or updated National Action Plans, one-third of which lack both a budget and a domestic security assessment. Only Albania has a National Action Plan that includes both a dedicated budget and substantive analysis of women’s and girls’ human rights in conflict settings and at home.

Norway and Luxembourg continue to meet or exceed the longstanding 0.7% of gross national income ODA target, but several countries that previously positioned themselves as leaders have retreated. The United Kingdom, France, and Finland have all fallen back from the benchmark, and Spain is unlikely to meet its 2027 target without significantly increased spending. Direct funding to women’s rights organizations remains critically low, with just 0.1% of total

ODA reaching women’s rights and women-led organizations between 2014 and 2023.

Protections for migrant workers—the majority of whom are women concentrated in domestic and care work—remain critically underdeveloped. Fifteen years after adoption, almost two-thirds of assessed countries have not ratified ILO Convention No. 189 on domestic workers, and less than one-third have ratified ILO Convention No. 97 on migration for employment. On labor more broadly, ILO Convention No. 190 on violence and harassment in the world of work—which explicitly recognizes the gendered nature of workplace abuse—saw ratifications grow from five to 24 countries since the 2023 Index, but uptake remains uneven.

In economic governance, only the United Kingdom and Brazil included substantive language tying tax reform to gender equality in United Nations Tax Convention inputs. The United States, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Germany have the highest Financial Secrecy Index scores, enabling the concealment of finances from tax authorities and eroding the fiscal space available for gender-responsive public services. Notably, strong economic justice scores are driven more by restraint from harmful practices than by the scale of a country’s economic power—the top rankings are held by a diverse mix of lower- and middle-income economies.

On institutional representation, Rwanda leads on women in parliament at 63.8%, followed by Mexico, Costa Rica, Sweden, and Bolivia—all countries with binding parity mechanisms. At the other end, Liberia, India, Hungary, Japan, and Brazil record the lowest levels. Half of all assessed countries have women filling under one-third of ministerial positions, and the overall distribution shows limited progress—particularly as parity measures are increasingly framed as antithetical to merit-based governance.

Climate represents the greatest area for growth, with the least amount of countries showing strong progress here. Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and the United Kingdom recognize women as agents of change in their Nationally Determined Contributions. Of the top 10 greenhouse gas emitters per capita, only Luxembourg is also a top per capita contributor to the Green Climate Fund.

The analysis reveals persistent gaps between commitment and practice across all seven domains. This is most visible in the peace and militarization pillar, where countries continue to endorse international norms while maintaining military spending and arms export practices that undermine them—suggesting that for some governments, engagement with gender equality norms functions as diplomatic signaling rather than a driver of policy coherence. Countries with declared feminist foreign policies do not

show up as consistently strong performers when evaluated across the full range of structural domains the Index covers, suggesting that current feminist foreign policy frameworks often leave key structural drivers of inequality under addressed. Where countries score highly on institutional legacy alone, the Index also reflects a methodological reality—formal commitments are more readily captured than erosion, contradiction, or failure to challenge deeper structural inequalities.

Recommendations

Addressing these gaps requires moving beyond declarations and engaging directly with the arenas where power, resources, and accountability are negotiated. The Index identifies six priorities:

1. **Close the rhetoric-to-resources gap**—establish binding targets for gender-targeted ODA and prioritize direct funding to women’s rights organizations.
2. **Strengthen accountability and implementation**—move existing frameworks from ratification to funded, monitored action across labor, migration, and security.
3. **Use frameworks more strategically**—conduct gender impact assessments of trade and investment agreements and use normative frameworks as entry points toward binding standards.
4. **Address militarization**—recommit to disarmament frameworks, strengthen arms export controls, and redirect defense resources toward human security.
5. **Build cross-sectoral coalitions**—connect gender equality advocacy to live negotiations on tax, trade, climate, and security.
6. **Invest in better measurement**—develop behavioral and implementation-sensitive indicators that capture whether commitments translate into material change.

The strategic challenge ahead is not to accumulate more commitments, but to intervene more coherently in the processes that matter most—so that gender equality is anchored not only in language and aspiration, but in the rules, financing, and shifts in power needed to advance it.

Introduction

The 2026 Gender Equality in Foreign Policy (GEFP) Index is coming at a markedly different political moment than the one that shaped its first iteration in 2023. Then, the field was defined by expansion, experimentation, and genuine debate: more governments were exploring feminist foreign and development policy as a way to organize external action, established champions were extending their approaches into areas such as trade and climate. There was also a sense that gender equality could be pushed more firmly into the center of multilateral and foreign policy agendas.

That moment, and the agenda that defined it, have narrowed. Since then, conflicts have deepened, the multilateral system has come under sustained strain, and the financing landscape has deteriorated sharply, including a significant drop in Official Development Assistance (ODA) overall and in bilateral allocable ODA with gender equality objectives.

This is precisely why an updated Index is needed now—not to retreat into a smaller or safer agenda, but to respond more pragmatically to the one in front of us. Building on the conceptual and methodological foundations of the 2023 FFP Index, the Gender Equality in Foreign Policy Index provides a comparative framework for assessing the gap between governments' stated commitments to gender equality and their actual policy and practice across seven domains of international engagement: peace and militarization, official development assistance, migration, labor protections, economic justice, institutional commitments, and climate action.

Its focus on foreign policy reflects the fact that many of these issues have cross-border effects on gender equality outcomes by shaping access to resources, enabling conditions, and violence beyond national borders. Grounded in priority areas identified by the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and drawing on academic literature, multilateral agreements, and civil society contributions, the Index uses a set of quantitative indicators to score and rank countries — making visible **where structural integration of gender equality is strongest, where gaps persist, and where opportunities for reform exist.**

Scores are assigned at the indicator level, aggregated into priority area scores, and combined into an overall country ranking, allowing for both cross-country comparison and thematic diagnosis within specific policy domains.

Importantly, the shift from a Feminist Foreign Policy Index to a broader Gender Equality in Foreign Policy Index reflects the view that the issues at stake are not optional ambitions or branding choices. They are rooted in longstanding obligations and negotiated frameworks: human rights law, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action; Women, Peace, and Security commitments; labor standards; climate frameworks; and the wider body of multilateral agreements through which states have already recognized responsibilities on equality, nondiscrimination, participation, and redistribution. The question, then, is not only who claims a feminist label, but who is meeting, advancing, or undermining these commitments in practice.

This broader framing also reflects the limits we have reached in the current conversation. Gender equality has been fragmented into sub-agendas, isolated from the economic and political systems that shape outcomes, and reduced to a declaratory mode that produces language without leverage. What gets lost in the process is the harder but more consequential work of addressing the structural drivers of inequality: the terms of financing, the distribution of fiscal space, the governance of trade and investment, the concentration of militarized power, the rules that enable financial secrecy, and the institutional choices that determine whose security, labor, and rights are protected. A more serious agenda for gender equality has to reconnect these questions.

This Index is intended as one contribution to that reconnection. The Index works to re-anchor gender equality in the arenas where power is negotiated. That means returning attention to existing frameworks and agreements as contested tools that can still be used to demand accountability, expose contradiction, and push for reform. It is meant for policymakers and advocates alike: as a tool to sharpen strategy, strengthen narratives, and support a more grounded form of ambition—one that is responsive to current constraints without surrendering the structural horizon of feminist change. In that sense, this is both a mapping exercise and an invitation to

move beyond stale debates, reconnect gender equality advocacy to lived realities and ongoing negotiations, and reclaim a more coherent, political, and practical agenda for change.

Scope and Boundaries

The Gender Equality in Foreign Policy Index evaluates how governments translate commitments to gender equality into measurable policy outcomes across seven priority areas of international engagement:


- **Peace & Militarization** ↗
- **Official development assistance (ODA)** ↗
- **Migration for employment** ↗
- **Labor protections** ↗
- **Economic justice** ↗
- **Institutional commitments to gender equality** ↗
- **Climate governance** ↗

Building on the 2023 FFP Index, it assesses not only what governments commit to, but also how those commitments are reflected in financing, institutional frameworks, and multilateral behavior.

Figure 1

Countries included in the 2026 GEF Index analysis.

 New Country  Countries previously included



The 2026 Index covers 57 countries, selected on the basis of the following criteria: countries or subnational governments that have advanced or attempted to advance gender equality through an FFP framework, including those that have since rescinded such policies; countries that have expressed interest in or are actively working toward an FFP; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members, partners, and candidates for accession; and countries relevant to the ICRW Network's global engagement. This iteration expands the scope of analysis to include nine additional countries not assessed in 2023: Albania, Bolivia, Honduras, Kenya, Liberia, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, and Rwanda. Their inclusion reflects a deliberate effort to broaden geographic representation and capture a wider range of policy contexts, particularly across the Global South.

The Index relies on the most recent comparable data available across countries, which may not fully capture recent shifts in government positions (see Appendix A for all data and sources). In cases such as Argentina, where there have been highly visible policy changes over the past year, current scores will reflect prior commitments. Future iterations of the Index may capture these policy changes as updated data becomes available.

Each priority area is scored on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 represents the strongest performance on the indicators assessed — for example, ratifying key international frameworks, directing higher levels of aid toward gender equality, or maintaining lower levels of military expenditure. A median score close to 1 indicates that most countries perform strongly across that area, while a median score closer to 0 suggests that most countries have significant room for improvement. These scores allow for comparisons both across countries and across priority areas.

It is not within the scope of this Index to provide a detailed analysis of domestic policy or to explain the complete political, economic, and institutional drivers behind individual country positions. The Index is designed as a comparative tool to identify patterns, gaps, and outliers across countries, rather than to offer a specific country-level diagnosis. It is intended to serve as a starting point for further analysis, and we hope it can support advocates and researchers in undertaking more detailed, context-specific investigations into the factors shaping national approaches to gender equality.

Across any global Index, a core methodological reality is that available indicators are better equipped to capture formal commitment more than implementation, influence, or lived outcomes. The Index shows where governments are positioned institutionally and some material realities based on available data, but it cannot fully assess whether those commitments are funded, enforced, or translated into material change or shifts in power. Relatedly, some indicators count participation or presence but it is worth cautioning that this does not necessarily show who holds senior roles, shapes agendas, or speaks with real authority. Where global standards are weak, uneven, or incomplete, the Index draws on softer policy instruments such as action plans, reporting frameworks, gender provisions, and political commitments. These do not by themselves guarantee accountability or structural change, but they remain important markers of state positioning and can serve as practical entry points for strengthening national implementation and advancing more robust international standards over time.

Taken together, these point to a clear agenda for future research: expanding the use of behavioral, implementation, and power-sensitive indicators, and deepening analysis of the wider structural forces that continue to shape gender inequality across borders.

You can learn more about the Index and the methodology [here](#) ↗

Priority Area 1

Peace and Militarization

Militarization and armed conflict are deeply gendered: they heighten women’s and girls’ exposure to violence, displacement, and economic marginalization, while excluding them from the peace and security decisions that shape their lives. Evidence shows that higher levels of militarization are associated with worse gender equality outcomes, including lower women’s labor force participation and political representation (Yıldırım and Korkmaz, 2022, p. 6-8). Women remain significantly under-represented in formal peace processes despite clear evidence that their participation strengthens the durability and inclusiveness of peace agreements (European Parliament 2025, p.3). Over the past ten years (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 2025, p.1), military and defense budgets have continuously expanded amidst rising geopolitical tensions. At the same time, social investments and official development assistance, both critical levers to address gender inequalities, are projected to continue declining (OECD, 2025, p.1). Demilitarization is, therefore, not peripheral but central to gender equality: militarized systems fuel gender-based violence, entrench inequality, intensify violence through the proliferation of weapons, and divert public resources away from the social investment needed for long-term equality and human security.

The peace and militarization priority area evaluates the extent to which states contribute to international peace and security by ratifying foundational disarmament frameworks,

reducing the volume of military expenditure and international arms transfers, and supporting gender-responsive approaches to peacebuilding. Together, these indicators capture how states allocate resources between military and social priorities, their participation in international disarmament regimes, and their commitment to integrating gender perspectives within peace and security policy. Domestic militarization and its implications for gender equality remain an interest of this priority area, but in the absence of a global dataset, is not included in this analysis.

Arms Transfers per Capita, in millions of SIPRI trend-indicator values (TIVs)


Across the 57 countries included in the dataset, the average value is 94.8 TIVs, while the median is significantly lower at 18.7, indicating that **arms exports per capita are highly concentrated among a small number of countries**. Between 2014 and 2024, **Israel had the highest aggregate arms transfers per capita (1,323.5 TIVs) of all evaluated countries, with over double the arms exports of the second-highest** (France, at 466.5 TIVs), and over six times as many as the United Kingdom (191.3 TIVs), the tenth-highest arms exporter. By contrast, most countries in the dataset export relatively small volumes of arms relative to their population size, with **several countries recording values at or close to zero**, including Costa Rica, Honduras, Iceland, Kenya, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Nepal, Peru, and Rwanda.

¹ Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) are a unit of measurement developed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to allow for consistent comparisons of arms transfers across countries and over time. Unlike financial values, TIVs reflect the military capability being transferred rather than the commercial price paid, and are calculated based on the known production costs of comparable weapons systems.

The highest per capita average value recorded in the dataset exceeds USD 2,669 (Israel), followed by the United States (USD 2,261), Norway (USD 1,441), Australia (USD 1,138), and Türkiye (USD 1,004), while the lowest value is approximately USD 4.8 (Liberia).

Figure 2


Countries with the most arms exports per capita, 2014-2025



Military Expenditure (average 2014-2024 per capita, in USD)

Figure 3

Countries with the Greatest Military Expenditure per capita, 2014-2024



Ratification of Normative Frameworks

Ratification of international disarmament frameworks is consistently high across the treaties reviewed: 46 of the 57 reviewed countries are full signatories to the **Arms Trade Treaty**, 45 countries have ratified the **Firearms Protocol** and 44 have ratified the **Landmine Treaty**. Notably, of the 13 countries in the dataset who are not signatories to the Landmine Treaty, five (Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland) have withdrawn recently, citing the deteriorating regional security after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the main cause of withdrawal. Uptake of the **Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons** is markedly lower, with only 12 ratifications and three signatures, and a clear pattern of ratifications primarily from the Global South, with only two ratifications from the Global North (Ireland and New Zealand). Additionally, South Africa is the only African country in our dataset to have fully ratified it, potentially indicating a gap in engagement and advocacy for the adoption of the treaty in the continent.

National Action Plans on Security Council Resolution 1325

Only 18 countries in the dataset have adopted or updated National Action Plans (NAPs) on Women, Peace, and Security. One-third of those NAPs include neither a budget nor an assessment of security issues within the country. **Only one country (Albania) had a NAP that includes both a dedicated budget and an analysis of the human rights of women and girls both in conflict settings and within its own borders.**

Overall Trends in Peace and Militarization

Rankings: Peace and Militarization			
Top 10		Bottom 10	
Peru	0.99	Korea	0.68
Honduras	0.97	Türkiye	0.68
Costa Rica	0.97	Estonia	0.68
Mexico	0.97	France	0.67
Albania	0.97	Norway	0.64
South Africa	0.97	India	0.51
Chile	0.94	Morocco	0.50
Brazil	0.94	United States	0.24
Austria	0.92	Nepal	0.10
Argentina	0.89	Israel	0.00

Across the 57 countries, the average score for this thematic area is **0.76**, with scores ranging from 0 to 0.989, and the median is 0.80. Country rankings within this priority area reflect both levels of militarization and engagement with disarmament and gender-responsive peace and security frameworks, capturing both the material dimensions of militarization and the extent to which states are aligned with the normative architecture intended to constrain it. This is evident in cases such as Nepal, which, despite very low levels of military expenditure and no arms exports, ranks near the bottom of the priority area due to limited participation in key international instruments.

These findings point to a stark and persistent concentration of militarized power: **a relatively small number of countries continue to dominate global arms exports while also sustaining some of the highest levels of military expenditure.** This concentration means that global patterns of militarization are shaped disproportionately by the decisions of a limited group of states whose defense industries, strategic alliances, and geopolitical influence allow them to set the terms of armed power far beyond their borders.

This concentration of hard power continues to overwhelm the normative architecture meant to constrain it. The slow uptake of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the fraying of the broader nuclear disarmament regime, and the limited implementation of Women, Peace, and Security commitments all point to the same political reality: formal endorsement of peace, disarmament, and gender-responsive security has not translated into a meaningful shift away from militarized statecraft. Women remain under-represented in peace processes and security institutions, conflict prevention remains under-financed and sidelined, and humanitarian arms control norms are increasingly treated as expendable when confronted with acute security fears.

These patterns are broadly consistent with the previous Index, suggesting that the structural drivers of militarization remain largely intact. The central contradiction, then, is not a lack of policy language, but **the fact that commitments to peace and gender equality continue to be dwarfed by the material and political weight of military spending, arms exports, and the states that profit from both.**

Recommendations: Peace and Militarization

For Policymakers

For Advocates

Strengthen oversight of arms transfers, improving transparency around military spending to better align policy decisions with existing peace; Women, Peace, and Security; and disarmament commitments.

Coordinate advocacy efforts on promoting transparency, licensing criteria, and parliamentary or congressional oversight on arms exports.

Ensure that NAPs under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 are funded, monitored, and linked to foreign and security institutions rather than left as standalone commitments.

Focus efforts on narrowing the gap between stated commitments and practice, pressing governments to apply existing gender and human rights standards more consistently to export decisions, budget choices, and peace and security processes.

Continue to highlight and challenge the impact of militarization on social cohesion, development, democracy, and human rights.

Focus efforts on narrowing the gap between stated commitments and practice, pressing governments to apply existing gender and human rights standards more consistently to export decisions, budget choices, and peace and security processes.

Priority Area 2

Official Development Assistance


Development cooperation represents one of the primary channels through which states influence global development outcomes. For the past decade, Official Development Assistance (ODA) has served as a key instrument through which governments operationalized gender equality commitments through their foreign policy. International research shows that gender-responsive development investments contribute to improved social and economic outcomes, including enhanced access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities. Feminist advocates have emphasized the importance of directing resources toward local women's rights organizations and feminist movements, which remain significantly underfunded despite their critical role in advancing gender equality, protecting civic space, and environmental stewardship. Yet by 2026, declining aid budgets, rising humanitarian demands, and the shifts to prioritize defense and military budgets have underscored the limits of ODA as a standalone measure of feminist intent.²

This domain evaluates both the scale of development assistance and the extent to which it prioritizes gender equality objectives.

² This section does not include the full range of countries in our dataset, but focuses on those reporting international development assistance to the OECD Development Assistance Committee, reducing the dataset for this priority area from 57 to 32. Per the OECD methodology, current numbers reflect 2024 reporting.

Figure 4

Countries with the Greatest and Least Net ODA as % of GNI



Percentage of ODA as share of Gross National Income (GNI)

The overall volume of ODA as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) is a longstanding benchmark and advocacy ask. As in the previous edition of the Index, historical champions— most notably Norway and Luxembourg—continue to meet or exceed the longstanding 0.7% target. Their performance reflects a durable cross-party consensus around development cooperation and a policy architecture that insulates aid budgets from short-term political pressures.

By contrast, several countries that had previously positioned themselves as leaders have retreated from this benchmark. The United Kingdom has not returned to the 0.7% target following its pandemic-era reduction to 0.5% and is expected to further decline to 0.3% by 2027–2028. France, despite embedding a commitment to development cooperation in legislation, has seen stalled progress amid broader fiscal tightening. Finland has also dropped in ranking, reflecting both budgetary pressures and shifting domestic priorities. Additionally, Spain has reiterated its intentions of reaching the 0.7% target by 2027, but current spending levels suggest that meeting this target will require greater, sustained increases.

Even prior to slashing its foreign assistance budget, the United States ranked in the bottom portion of countries assessed. Although it remains the largest donor in absolute terms, this persistent low score is a reminder that raw volume does not equal proportional commitment. **The bottom-ranked countries remain unchanged from the 2023 Index.**

ODA for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

The volume of ODA that includes gender equality objectives, both principal and significant, is a key measure of how governments operationalize gender equality commitments in foreign policy and a longstanding advocacy target.³ **Countries in the top 10 for this indicator remain consistent with the previous edition.** However, notably absent are Finland, the United Kingdom, and France, which ranked highly on overall ODA as a percentage of GNI. France provides the most striking example. Despite adopting a FFP in 2019 and legislating in 2021 that 75% of its ODA should contribute to gender equality by 2025, it does not appear among the top-ranked countries for gender-focused allocations. Spain shows a similar pattern. While its FFP announcement generated expectations of increased gender-responsive funding, its allocations remain below those of several non-FFP countries.

³ For an explanation of the OECD Gender Marker, please see: [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/GEN\(2025\)2/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/GEN(2025)2/en/pdf)

Figure 5

Countries with the greatest and least ODA to gender equality per capita, constant USD average, 2014 - 2024




Figure 4. Source: OECD, n.d.b


ODA for Sector Code 15170, “Women’s Rights Organizations, and Movements and Government Institutions”

Direct funding to women’s rights organizations, movements, and government institutions represents the most targeted expression of gender equality commitment within ODA; yet, globally, it remains woefully low, with just 0.1% of total ODA reaching women’s rights and women-led organizations directly between 2014 and 2023.

Performance on this indicator reveals a different set of leaders than those observed in the other ODA measures. Finland, which did not rank strongly on overall ODA to gender equality, appears here as a top donor to women’s rights organizations, demonstrating that intentional channeling decisions matter as much as aggregate spending levels. Australia similarly shows up higher in this indicator despite not ranking as high on the others. The United States appears in the bottom 10 again, despite recent efforts to address this gap and a former commitment to localization of development funds.

Figure 6

Countries with the greatest and least ODA to Sector 15170 per capita constant US\$ average, 2014 - 2024



Overall Trends in ODA

Rankings: ODA			
Top 10		Bottom 10	
Norway	1.00	Estonia	0.020
Sweden	0.76	Slovenia	0.020
Netherlands	0.57	Portugal	0.015
Luxembourg	0.57	Hungary	0.012
Iceland	0.41	Lithuania	0.009
Denmark	0.32	Czech Republic	0.008
Switzerland	0.32	Latvia	0.005
Germany	0.31	Greece	0.002
Ireland	0.28	Slovak Republic	0.001
Finland	0.27	Poland	0.001

The overall composite score for this priority area remains largely consistent with the 2023 Index. This apparent stability, however, masks a deteriorating trajectory in which major donors—including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany—reduced their ODA in 2024, marking the first time since 1995 that all four countries cut aid in the same year and leading the OECD to forecast a drop of between 9% and 18% from 2024 to 2025 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2025). Although projections specific to gender-focused ODA are not yet available, previous patterns indicate that gender equality programming is often among the first areas to face cuts when overall aid commitments shrink. As a result, future iterations of the GEFP Index are

likely to capture sharper declines in both overall ODA levels and gender-responsive allocations.

Although FFP declarations have been tentatively associated with increased investment in gender equality through ODA, one of the clearest findings in this priority area is the gap between overall aid volume and gender-responsive allocation. High performance on ODA as a share of GNI does not automatically translate into a high share of aid targeting gender equality as a principal objective. Governments that have adopted feminist policy frameworks or ambitious legislative targets on gender equality in aid do not yet rank among the strongest performers on gender-focused allocations. **This suggests that rhetorical and legal commitments have**

not consistently translated into programmatic change, and that fiscal pressures and shifting political priorities may be slowing or constraining implementation.

These trends in ODA flows reinforce a core finding from the 2023 FFP Index: while feminist and gender-equality language has become increasingly mainstreamed in foreign policy discourse, corresponding budgetary commitments have remained politically vulnerable and inconsistent across electoral cycles, even in countries with explicit FFP frameworks. While a “doing more with less” narrative may appear to be a feasible alternative or solution in these times of contraction, there is a real risk that broader recognition of non-financial contributions becomes a substitute for material support rather than a complement to it. In other words, focusing on protecting what remains, improving the quality and transparency of what is counted, and introducing new measures of other forms of cooperation should not be normalizing retrenchment.

Recommendations: ODA

For Policymakers

Improve what counts as development cooperation rather than relying too narrowly on existing Development Assistance Committee-style metrics. This can include reporting more systematically on other forms of contribution, including technical cooperation, support through multilateral and regional institutions, diplomatic leadership on gender-related financing norms, and partnerships with actors in the Global South.

Increase transparency on how gender markers are applied, distinguishing more clearly between principal and significant objectives in programming decisions.

For Advocates

Focus advocacy efforts on safeguarding existing gender-related resources, improving transparency and reporting quality, and protecting direct support to women’s rights actors.

Use fiscal and defense debates as an entry point to gender-responsive ODA as an investment in long-term stability and conflict prevention rather than as a competing priority, as governments expand military and security spending.

Recommendations: ODA

For Policymakers

Expand the share of direct, flexible, and predictable funding that reaches women’s rights organizations and relevant public institutions.

For Advocates

Provide recommendations that broaden recognition of South-South cooperation and non-financial cooperation, which may be more feasible in this political moment.

Priority Area 3

Migration for Employment

The Migration for Employment priority area evaluates the extent to which states support the rights, protections, and social inclusion of migrants through both domestic policy frameworks and international normative commitments.


Migration is closely intertwined with global patterns of gender inequality and influenced by gendered hierarchies that shape who migrates, under what conditions, and with what protections. Global demand for care work is a key driver of the migration of women, sustaining transnational care chains in which migrant women fill care deficits in destination countries while leaving unpaid care responsibilities to other women and girls in their countries of origin. These patterns reinforce and redistribute gender inequalities across borders (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2024, p.1).

Migrant workers often experience intersecting forms of discrimination based on their gender, migration status, language, ethnicity, and employment conditions, and these inequalities can expose migrant women to heightened risks of exploitation and gender-based violence. Additionally, migrant women are frequently concentrated in sectors characterized by precarious employment, including domestic work, caregiving, and other forms of undervalued labor that sustain households and social welfare systems. These sectors are central to the functioning of national economies, particularly in high-income countries where migrant labor fills structural gaps in care systems and service sectors.

Migrant Integration Policy Index

The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) evaluates the extent to which policies enable migrants to access rights and opportunities comparable to those of citizens across areas such as labor market mobility, education, health, and anti-discrimination protections. Across the 57 countries in the dataset, the average MIPEX score is approximately 51.5, with scores ranging from 24 to 86. These values indicate that most countries provide moderate levels of integration support, although important differences exist in the comprehensiveness of national migration policies. Countries with the strongest migration integration scores in the dataset include Sweden, Finland, Portugal, and Canada, all of which have relatively robust policy frameworks supporting migrant access to social services, employment opportunities, and legal protections. None of the included countries had MIPEX values below “slightly unfavorable.”

Figure 7
MIPEX Score




Source: Migrant Policy Group, n.d.

Ratification of International Labor and Migration Frameworks

Fifteen years after its adoption, only 40 countries around the world have ratified ILO Convention No. 189, which establishes labor protections for domestic workers, including provisions related to fair wages, working conditions, social protections, and safeguards against exploitation. This slow uptake is reflected in our data: almost two-thirds of the 57 countries have not yet ratified this landmark convention.


ILO Convention No. 97 establishes international standards governing labor migration, including provisions related to recruitment practices, working conditions, and equal treatment for migrant workers. Uptake is similarly limited: less than one-third (16; 28.1%) of the 57 countries in the dataset have ratified the convention.

ILO 189 domestic workers



 Ratification  Not signed/ratified

ILO 97 Migration for employment



 Ratification  Not signed/ratified

Figure 8 Source: ILO n.d.a, n.d.b

Overall Trends in Migration

The average score for this thematic area is approximately 0.29, with scores ranging from 0 to 0.98. The wide range of values reflects substantial variation in both domestic migration policies and participation in international labor standards, pointing to uneven progress in building coherent and inclusive migration systems. Notably, no country reaches the highest MIPEx “very favorable” category, and the majority clusters in the “halfway favorable” range. This distribution suggests that most countries have established partial integration frameworks that remain insufficient to deliver equitable and inclusive outcomes, particularly for migrant women.

Several countries with relatively strong performance in this priority area are longstanding destination countries for migrants, with sustained immigration over several decades, including labor migration, family reunification, and more recent humanitarian migration flows. As a result, governments have gradually developed more comprehensive policy frameworks to manage migrant integration and ensure access to public institutions.

By contrast, many countries that score lower in this priority area, such as India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Liberia, and Rwanda, have historically functioned primarily as countries of origin. In these contexts, migration policy has often focused more on managing labor emigration, facilitating remittances, and protecting nationals working abroad rather than establishing extensive integration frameworks for incoming migrants.

Rankings: Migration			
Top 10		Bottom 10	
Portugal	0.98	Slovak Republic	0.02
Belgium	0.86	Lithuania	0.01
Norway	0.85	Latvia	0.01
Brazil	0.80	China	0.01
Spain	0.80	Liberia	0.01
Germany	0.77	Mongolia	0.01
Italy	0.74	Nepal	0.01
Sweden	0.71	Rwanda	0.01
Finland	0.70	Indonesia	0.01
New Zealand	0.65	India	0.00

Migration patterns have diversified significantly in recent decades, with a notable increase in South-South migration, particularly within regions such as Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Several countries that historically experienced primarily outward migration are increasingly functioning as both countries of origin and countries of destination, yet policy frameworks in these settings are often still nascent or fragmented.

These national gaps are compounded by weak participation in international frameworks. **The limited uptake of ILO Conventions No. 189 (on domestic workers) and No. 97 (on migration for employment) is especially consequential in sectors such as domestic and care work, where migrant women are concentrated and protections are weakest.** As a result, labor rights, social protection, and enforcement remain inconsistent even where broader integration policies exist. In lower-performing contexts, weak domestic systems and low ratification rates create compounded vulnerabilities and indicate a global ceiling for policy ambition and implementation. For GEFP, this highlights the need for more coherent and ambitious approaches linking stronger integration systems with expanded adoption of international labor standards and shifting toward gender-transformative policies that address structural inequalities and protect migrant women and other marginalized groups.

Recommendations: Migration

For Policymakers

Move beyond symbolic commitment to enforceable labor protections: prioritize the ratification of ILO Conventions No. 189 and 97, and pair ratification with national implementation plans, budget allocations, and enforcement mechanisms (especially in feminized sectors).

For Advocates

Integrate a migration lens into care advocacy by treating migrant care workers as central to how care systems are sustained, subsidized, and stratified across borders. This includes:

- Calling for decent work, regularization pathways, labor protections, portability of social protection, ethical recruitment standards, and freedom of association for migrant care workers;
- Advocating for national care strategies that explicitly include migrant domestic and care workers; and
- Building coalitions between feminist groups, migrant worker organizations, domestic worker unions, and care policy advocates.

Recognize care work as essential infrastructure by:

- Extending full labor rights and protections to domestic and care workers;
- Formalizing care work through certification systems and employer accountability mechanisms; and
- Establishing protection and reporting mechanisms of abuses, including gender-based violence, that can be safely used by formal and informal migrants.

Pair calls for public investment in care with demands for decent work, regularization pathways, labor protections, portability of social protections, ethical recruitment standards, and freedom of association.

Recommendations: Migration

For Policymakers

Strengthen origin-country policies, including gender-responsive predeparture support and reintegration programs for returnees.

Priority Area 4

Labor Protections

Labor market inequalities are closely linked to broader systems of gender inequality, particularly as global supply chains and labor markets become increasingly transnational and feminized. Women are more likely to work in sectors with weaker labor protections, unsafe working conditions, wage gaps, discrimination, and limited access to social protection (International Labour Organization, n.d.). However, due diligence and labor standards in global supply chains remain voluntary and are applied inconsistently at best.

In the absence of extraterritorial binding frameworks, this priority area evaluates the ratification of foundational ILO labor conventions as a proxy for supporting fair working conditions across global supply chains to assess the extent to which foreign policy addresses structural inequalities embedded in global labor markets.

Freedom of Association and Protection of the Rights to Organize (ILO Convention No. 87)

ILO Convention No. 87 establishes the right of workers and employers to form and join organizations of their choosing without interference from the state, and it is one of the fundamental labor rights conventions for collective worker representation. **Most countries included in the GEFP Index (49 of 57; 86%) have ratified the convention, reflecting broad international recognition of the importance of protecting workers' rights to organize.**

Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (ILO Convention No. 98)

As with Convention No. 87, ratification levels

among the countries included in the Index remain stable compared with the 2023 FFP Index.

Most countries (54 of 57; 95%) have adopted the convention, signaling formal commitments to collective bargaining as a mechanism for negotiating wages, working conditions, and labor protections.

Violence and Harassment in the World of Work (ILO Convention No. 190)

Adopted in 2019, ILO Convention No. 190 is particularly significant from a feminist policy perspective because it explicitly recognizes the gendered nature of workplace violence and harassment. Since the 2023 FFP Index, the number of countries that have ratified this convention has increased from five of 57 to 24 of 57, and an additional country (Norway) signed the convention.


The increase in ratifications reflects growing international recognition of the need to address violence and harassment in the workplace.

However, ratification levels remain lower than those of the older labor conventions, reflecting Convention No. 190's relatively recent adoption.

Expanding ratification of Convention No. 190 is particularly important for protecting workers in sectors such as domestic work, hospitality, agriculture, and care work, where women and migrant workers often face heightened risks of abuse and limited access to formal complaint mechanisms.

Figure 9

**Number of Countries that have ratified
Convention 190, 2023 and 2025**



Source: ILO n.d.c

Overall Trends in Labor Protections

Rankings: Labour Protection		
<p>Twenty-four countries tied for the highest ranking (all received a score of 1): Argentina, Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, and United Kingdom</p>	Bottom 10	
	Switzerland	0.67
	Türkiye	0.67
	Brazil	0.33
	Kenya	0.33
	Morocco	0.33
	Nepal	0.33
	New Zealand	0.33
	China	0.00
	India	0.00
	United States	0.00

Overall Trends in Labor Protections

Countries ranking the highest in this priority area have ratified all three conventions assessed in the Index, while the lowest-scoring countries have gaps in ratification across one or more of the conventions. Ratification of ILO Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 remains high across the dataset, reflecting widespread formal commitment to collective labor rights. However, several countries have not adopted one or both conventions.

Notably, Brazil, China, India, Kenya, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, and the United States have not ratified either Convention No. 87 or Convention No. 190. Among these, China, India, and the United States have not ratified any of the three conventions assessed in this Index. Variation in this priority area is driven primarily by the adoption of ILO Convention No. 190 on Violence and Harassment in the World of Work, which has seen a growing but uneven pace of adoption.

Recommendations: Labor Protections

For Policymakers

Close ratification gaps by accelerating the ratification of ILO Convention No. 190, especially in countries that have already ratified Conventions No. 87 and No. 98.

- Accompany ratification with time-bound national implementation plans, including budget allocations and institutional responsibility protocols.

Strengthen labor inspection systems through funding, staffing, gender training, and increased mandates to monitor high-risk sectors.

Establish independent and safe enforcement and complaint mechanisms, especially for workers facing retaliation risks and in informal sectors.

For Advocates

Engage in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights' ongoing treaty process for establishing a legally binding document on business and human rights. This should include concrete feminist and labor rights demands, including binding standards on corporate accountability.

Track and publicize implementation gaps and mobilize cross-sector coalitions to advocate for ratification, implementation, and/or increased enforcement.

Center marginalized workers in advocacy strategies and support grassroots organizing, particularly where formal unionization is constrained.

Recommendations: Labor Protections

For Policymakers

Engage in the ongoing Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights treaty process on business and human rights more constructively by submitting concrete textual proposals and supporting stronger provisions on prevention, liability, and access to remedy, particularly for workers and communities facing heightened risk.

Expand data collection on workplace violence and harassment, collective bargaining coverage, and conditions in informal and formal sectors.

Priority Area 5

Economic Justice

Economic governance structures, including trade regimes, financial policies, and development financing mechanisms, influence patterns of inequality across and within countries. Feminist economists have emphasized that global economic systems often rely on gendered divisions of labor, undervalue care work and social reproduction, and contribute to violations of women’s rights, including by entrenching gendered occupational and wage gaps. Particularly in developing countries, governments face challenges related to onerous debt burdens; tax avoidance, evasion, and profit-shifting; and inequitable trade and investment agreements. These can all hurt countries’ ability to generate revenue and promote investments in social welfare and cohesion that are critical to addressing inequalities, including gender inequality. Economic justice is central to advancing gender equality in foreign policy, as global economic rules, financial systems, and development models shape access to resources, public services, and economic opportunity. Women and marginalized groups continue to face structural barriers as a result of ever-contracting fiscal space, regressive taxation systems, debt burdens, and inequitable trade and investment frameworks.

Social investments—especially those supporting institutions and systems that women and girls rely on, like education—are financed through public resourcing derived from tax bases. In enabling individuals to obscure their finances, many of these countries shrink their tax base that could resource these systems. In a time when ODA is being dramatically reduced and austerity measures

are being pushed on lower-income countries, this further reduces the funding base that may address long-term, sustainable needs for women and girls.

Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment


Consistent with the findings of the 2023 FFP Index, the United States, India, and South Africa have not yet endorsed the Buenos Aires Declaration, a nonbinding declaration that seeks to address women’s empowerment through removing barriers to trade. Under the expanded group of countries of analysis, Bolivia, Morocco, and Nepal join the list of countries that have yet to ratify the declaration, while Honduras, Mongolia, and Rwanda join those that have ratified.

The Financial Secrecy Index

The United States, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Germany have the highest Financial Secrecy Index score, reflecting their significant roles in enabling financial opacity through weak financial transparency rules that make it easier to hide wealth and avoid taxes. By contrast, Slovenia, Albania, Iceland, Rwanda, and Liberia have the lowest score.

Figure 10

Countries with the greatest and least financial secrecy by FSI value, 2025



Investor–State Dispute Settlements

The Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Navigator tracks known cases in which private investors have taken legal action against governments under international investment agreements. The countries listed reflect where those investors are based. **As in the previous iteration of this Index, investors based in the United States, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom initiated the highest number of cases against states, primarily in the Global South.** Iceland is notable as one of the only Global North countries with zero cases filed, followed by Ireland with only two.

Even where Global South countries have been increasing the number of disputes, **United States-based investors were engaged in over 10 times as many cases (238 versus 20 cases from China and 12 from India).** The disparity highlights that ISDS continues to concentrate power among investors from higher-income economies and constrain policy space in lower- and middle-income countries, including for gender-responsive regulation and public interest policies.

National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights

This indicator assesses whether states are developing or updating NAPs to promote the implementation of business and human rights frameworks, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. **Among the nine newly assessed countries, only Liberia, Mongolia, and Nepal have developed NAPs with references to gender and/or women’s rights.** As of this assessment, the United States also has a NAP with references to gender, but this may shift given the current administration’s pivot away from so-called “gender ideology.”

Countries with a strong vocal record on gender equality, such as Iceland and Canada, do not have NAPs, while France, Colombia, and Spain only reference NAP-aligned goals in broader frameworks, without dedicated or updated NAPs. Mexico, a long-term FFP country, does have a NAP, but it does not include references to gender or women’s rights.

Indicator Change

The 2023 Index evaluated support for a progressive international tax cooperation framework. Specifically, it looked at whether nations voted for developing the United Nations Tax Convention, which is now ongoing. In 2023, 10 of the 48 countries analyzed—including India, South Africa, Colombia, Mongolia, Albania, and China—had voted in favor, with many of the OECD Development Assistance Committee countries (including the United States and the European Union bloc) either voting against or abstaining. With negotiations ongoing, the 2026 Index has adjusted the indicator to evaluate inputs that include references to gender equality or women’s rights.

Statements in Support of Gender Considerations in the United Nations Tax Convention Negotiations

Only two countries evaluated, the United Kingdom and Brazil, included substantive language tying tax reform to gender equality. The Africa Group at the United Nations also put forward language, though less substantive. No other country, including countries with an FFP and public commitments to gender equality, included relevant language.

Rankings: Economic Justice			
Top 10		Bottom 10	
Liberia	0.99	Israel	0.54
Argentina	0.98	Australia	0.54
Mongolia	0.92	Germany	0.54
Belgium	0.91	Austria	0.53
Brazil	0.91	Türkiye	0.52
Indonesia	0.89	China	0.50
Nepal	0.88	Canada	0.47
Japan	0.87	Bolivia	0.10
Italy	0.86	South Africa	0.10
Mexico	0.82	United States	0.01

The countries with the strongest economic justice scores reflect a notably heterogeneous mix of economic structures, geopolitical positioning, and development trajectories. The list brings together countries with very different economic roles, from large, regionally influential economies with diversified production and growing global engagement (such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina), to smaller or lower-income economies that remain more dependent on external capital and investment flows (such as Liberia, Mongolia, and Nepal).

Taken together, top and bottom performers suggest that strong economic justice scores are driven more by restraint from harmful practices and engagement with normative frameworks than by the scale of a country’s economic power.

Looking across the indicators, we can propose a tentative hypothesis: emerging economies, such as India and South Africa, continue to prioritize multilateral negotiated agreements as instruments of justice and equity over nonbinding, declaratory documents. Conversely, Global North countries tend to favor voluntary endorsement over negotiated, binding agreements that would place real limits on their power and activities. In that sense, the opportunity is not only to insert gender into existing multilateral debates but also to recast gender equality itself as a test of whether states are genuinely willing to pursue justice through collective, negotiated change.

Recommendations: Economic Justice

For Policymakers

Push and coordinate messaging for gender equality to be built into the United Nations Tax Convention’s architecture from the start by requiring gender impact assessments of tax rules, sex-disaggregated analysis of distributional effects, and explicit attention to how international tax abuse erodes the fiscal space needed for care, social protection, and public services.

For Advocates

Use the development and reform of NAPs as a tool to strengthen due diligence and reporting of discrimination and violations of labor rights and the human rights of women and girls.

Recommendations: Economic Justice

For Policymakers

For Advocates

Strengthen transparency, close tax loopholes, and reduce illicit financial flows to increase public resources for gender-responsive services such as care, education, and social protection.

Work with states more willing to use negotiated multilateral agreements to redistribute power, resources, and accountability as entry points for creating transformative change.

Adopt domestic laws that allow courts and regulators to hear serious cross-border cases involving corporate abuse when companies are domiciled, headquartered, or substantially operating in the state’s jurisdiction. Pair this with mandatory human rights due diligence and civil liability rules.

Move beyond the increasingly thin terrain of voluntary endorsement and declaratory support, and focus advocacy efforts to intervene more directly where the material conditions for gender justice are shaped: tax, debt, public finance, trade, and the rules of global economic governance.

Use the ongoing United Nations Commission on International Trade Law reform process to narrow investor privileges in practice by backing the multilateral reform instrument, a standing mechanism, and stronger procedural rules, while also revising future investment treaties so governments retain clearer policy space for labor rights, public services, climate action, and gender equality measures.

Build broader and more strategic alliances, including with actors who may not always speak the language of feminist policy most explicitly but are more open to structural reform.

Priority Area 6

Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality

Institutional commitments, including ratifying and implementing international legal frameworks and promoting inclusive governance structures, shape how states articulate, operationalize, and are held accountable for advancing gender equality. Instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) establish normative standards and, through reporting and review processes, create practical accountability mechanisms that can reinforce policy alignment across national and international spaces, particularly when their recommendations are integrated into other review frameworks.

This priority area evaluates the ratification of CEDAW without reservations, both for its role as the central global treaty on women's rights and because as a treaty body process that generates concluding observations and follow-up, it can function as a practical accountability mechanism. This is especially true when its recommendations are carried into other reporting and review spaces, including the Universal Periodic Review and Voluntary National Reviews. This priority area also reviews representation in parliament and in ministerial positions, because women's equal participation in decision-making is a cornerstone of nondiscrimination and a necessary, if insufficient, condition for better gender equality outcomes—an approach grounded in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action's

commitments on women in power and decision-making and reinforced by CEDAW General Recommendation No. 40, which frames equal and inclusive representation as a matter of both equal access and equal power within decision-making systems.

Ratification of CEDAW

CEDAW enjoys near-universal ratification, with **the United States as the lone, persistent outlier. However, approximately a third of the countries (17) have submitted reservations—formal declarations exempting them from specific provisions.**

Women in National Parliaments

Across the 57 countries in the dataset, the median share of women in national parliaments is 32.6%, and the proportions range from 11% to 64%.

Several countries have achieved relatively high levels of representation. **Rwanda records the highest share of women in parliament in 2024, at approximately 63.8%. This is followed by Mexico (50.2%), Costa Rica (49.1%), Sweden (46.7%), and Bolivia (46.2%).** Many of these countries have implemented institutional mechanisms to increase women's political participation, including gender quotas, parity laws, or party-level candidate requirements.


Case Study: Mexico

Beginning in the 2000s, Mexico adopted a series of electoral reforms requiring political parties to nominate increasing proportions of female candidates. These reforms culminated in the 2019 constitutional amendment known as “Paridad en Todo” (“Parity in Everything”), which requires gender parity across federal and state legislatures, cabinet positions, judicial institutions, and autonomous public bodies. As a result, Mexico now ranks among the countries with the highest levels of women’s representation in national legislatures. The Mexican case illustrates how binding institutional mechanisms such as constitutional parity provisions and candidate quotas can translate formal commitments to gender equality into measurable changes in political representation.

At the lower end of the distribution, countries such as Liberia (11.0%), India (13.7%), Hungary (14.6%), Japan (15.7%), and Brazil (17.5%) record significantly lower levels of women’s parliamentary representation. In these contexts, structural barriers (including political party dynamics, electoral systems, and social norms) may limit women’s participation in political leadership. Despite progress in expanding women’s representation in legislatures, gender parity in parliamentary institutions remains uneven across countries.

Figure 11

Percent Women in Parliament, 2024



Women in Ministerial-Level Positions


Across the countries included in the dataset, the median value of women serving as ministers is 33.3%.

Representation varies widely, ranging from 0% to over 60%. Finland (61.1%) has the highest share, followed closely by Iceland (60.0%) and Estonia (58.3%). Chile, Spain, and the United Kingdom also show gender parity in ministerial leadership.

Conversely, several countries continue to exhibit very low levels of women’s representation in ministerial positions. **Hungary records no women serving in ministerial roles,** while Bulgaria (5.3%), India (5.6%), Türkiye (5.9%), the Czech Republic (6.7%), China (8.3%), and Nepal (9.5%) all report less than 1 in 10 ministers are women. **For half of the countries in our dataset, women fill under a third of ministerial positions.** These patterns highlight persistent and substantial gender disparities in executive political leadership.

Figure 12

Percentage of women ministers, 2025



Overall Trends in Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality

The average score for this priority area is approximately 0.52, with scores ranging from 0.04 to 0.87. **The results suggest that most countries have made at least some formal commitments to gender equality through international legal frameworks and increasing representation of women in political institutions.**

The widespread ratification of CEDAW reflects broad international acceptance of gender equality as a core human rights principle.

Rankings: Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality			
Top 10		Bottom 10	
Finland	0.87	Korea	0.30
Iceland	0.87	China	0.27
Mexico	0.82	Indonesia	0.27
Sweden	0.81	Bulgaria	0.25
Norway	0.79	Japan	0.24
South Africa	0.77	Türkiye	0.20
Rwanda	0.76	India	0.13
Belgium	0.74	Liberia	0.08
Costa Rica	0.73	United States	0.06
Chile	0.72	Hungary	0.04

The top-performing countries in this priority area demonstrate how strong institutional commitments can translate into higher levels of women's political representation. Many of these countries have adopted institutional mechanisms that actively promote gender parity in politics. For example, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Chile have implemented legislative parity frameworks that require gender-balanced candidate lists, while Nordic countries such as Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and Norway have longstanding party practices and political norms that support women's leadership. Rwanda and South Africa also stand out for achieving high levels of women's parliamentary representation through quota systems embedded in electoral and party structures. Together, these cases illustrate how institutional reforms can help translate formal commitments on gender equality into more inclusive political leadership.

However, while some countries have made substantial progress toward gender parity in both legislatures and executive leadership, others continue to exhibit low levels of women's participation in political decision-

making. Countries with lower scores often lack these institutional mechanisms or face structural barriers that limit women’s access to political leadership positions.

While the updated Index includes additional countries and more recent data on parliamentary and ministerial representation, **the overall distribution of results continues to reflect many of the structural dynamics identified in the 2023 FFP report. This demonstrates the limited progress made and the need for renewed commitment and accelerated progress, particularly at a time when efforts to advance parity are increasingly framed as discriminatory and antithetical to merit-based governance.**

Recommendations: Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality

For Policymakers

For Advocates

Adopt constitutional or electoral laws requiring gender parity or minimum quotas for candidate lists and public appointments, paired with clear sanctions for noncompliance (e.g., rejection of party lists, loss of public funding, or fines).

Coordinate cross-sector coalitions (women’s movements, labor groups, academia) to advocate for binding parity frameworks and counternarratives that frame gender equality measures as incompatible with merit-based governance.

Extend parity requirements beyond legislatures to include ministerial cabinets, senior civil service, and state-owned enterprises, with annual public reporting and compliance audits. Tie compliance to executive approval processes or parliamentary oversight.

Push for reforms that require data disaggregation and inclusion targets for women from marginalized groups (e.g., by ethnicity, socioeconomic status, parenting status), ensuring that representation reflects broader societal diversity.

Translate CEDAW concluding observations into time-bound, costed NAPs, approved by parliament and subject to mandatory progress reporting and budget allocations.

Strategically pursue legal action to challenge discriminatory electoral laws, weak quota enforcement, or failure to implement CEDAW obligations, leveraging domestic courts and international accountability mechanisms.

Recommendations: Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality

For Policymakers

Condition public funding to political parties on meeting gender parity targets in candidate nominations and leadership positions. Establish independent oversight bodies to verify compliance and enforce penalties.

Strengthen CEDAW's impact by carrying recommendations into other reporting processes, such as the Universal Periodic Review and the Voluntary National Reviews for Sustainable Development Goal reporting.

Priority Area 7

Climate

Climate change and environmental degradation remain urgent threats to the livelihoods and well-being of communities that have limited access to resources and decision-making processes. Women and girls experience disproportionate impacts from climate-related disasters, resource scarcity, and displacement, while remaining underrepresented in climate decision-making processes. At the same time, climate policies and investments shape economic opportunities, care burdens, and resilience capacities in ways that can either reinforce or reduce gender inequalities. Climate strategies that fail to account for gendered roles, labor patterns, and access to resources risk entrenching existing inequalities and undermining adaptation and mitigation outcomes. Conversely, policies that recognize women as leaders and agents of change can strengthen climate resilience, improve resource management, and support more equitable development pathways.

This priority area addresses the extent to which governments contribute to global climate mitigation efforts while promoting gender-responsive climate governance.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions per Capita

Greenhouse gas emissions per capita indicate countries' relative contributions to climate change while accounting for differences in population size. Between 2014 and 2023, the average emissions level was approximately 8.17 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per capita, although values ranged from zero to more than 24 tons per capita. These differences reflect variations in

economic structure, energy systems, and levels of industrialization and consumption.

Higher emissions levels per capita are typically associated with countries with energy-intensive economies, large fossil fuel sectors, or high levels of consumption. For example, high per capita emissions in Australia, Mongolia, and Canada are primarily driven by resource-intensive economies, fossil-fuel energy systems, small populations relative to industrial output, large geography requiring transport, and (for Canada and Mongolia) high heating demand.

From a climate justice perspective, average emissions per capita are an important indicator because they highlight the unequal distribution of responsibility for global climate change. Many higher-income countries continue to record significantly higher emissions levels than countries in the Global South, despite the latter often facing the most severe climate impacts.




Figure 13

Countries with greatest and lowest emissions per capita, averages 2014-2023

Women’s Participation in Climate Negotiation Delegations

The United Nations Climate Change Conferences are annual gatherings where delegations negotiate global action on climate change. At the Conference of the Parties (COP)18 in 2012, a gender balance goal was adopted, and parties were invited to strive for gender balance in their delegations. Yet, only about half (28; 49%) of the countries included in this Index generally achieved gender balance in their delegations between 2014 and 2025.

Figure 14a

Countries with least percent of women’s participation in party delegations, average 2014-2025





Figure 14b

Countries with highest percent of women’s participation in party delegations, average 2014-2025



Gender-Sensitive NDCs

This indicator assesses the extent to which countries integrate gender considerations into their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. NDCs outline national climate mitigation and adaptation commitments and represent the primary framework through which governments communicate their climate strategies.

Most NDCs included in the dataset were adopted in 2021 or earlier, and while many countries now reference gender equality in their climate plans, **only five (Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and the United Kingdom) recognize women as agents of change, and one NDC (Nepal’s) is considered gender-transformative.** Most countries (35; 61.4%) have NDCs that are considered gender-sensitive because they take gender into account across one or more components of the NDC. **Ten (17.5%) of the included countries have NDCs that make no reference to gender equality.**


Contributions to the Green Climate Fund per Capita

The Green Climate Fund is one of the primary international mechanisms to support climate mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries. Contribution levels vary significantly across the dataset. Over half (30) of the countries in the dataset have not pledged contributions to the Green Climate Fund, including the United States, which is one of the top emitters per capita of greenhouse gases.

Of the 10 countries with the greatest average greenhouse gas emissions per capita between 2014 and 2023, only Luxembourg is also in the 10 largest per capita contributors to the Green Climate Fund.

Figure 15

GCF pledged contributions per capita, USD, 2025



Net-Zero Pledges

Across the dataset, most countries (50) have adopted some form of net-zero commitment; however, the strength of these commitments varies widely. In some cases, governments have adopted legally binding targets (24), while others have announced political pledges that have not yet translated into policy or law (6). Seven of the included countries have not adopted any form of a net-zero pledge.

Overall Trends in Climate Governance

Rankings: Climate Governance			
Top 10		Bottom 10	
Sweden	0.74	Rwanda	0.09
United Kingdom	0.65	India	0.08
Denmark	0.58	Bulgaria	0.08
France	0.51	Bolivia	0.08
Luxembourg	0.50	Poland	0.08
Germany	0.48	Israel	0.05
Switzerland	0.46	Australia	0.05
Austria	0.42	Nepal	0.03
Iceland	0.40	Mongolia	0.02
Spain	0.39	United States	0.02

Across the 57 countries in the Index, the average score for this priority area is approximately 0.2, with values ranging from 0.02 to 0.74. The median score is approximately 0.125, indicating that overall performance in this priority area remains low compared to other areas.

Despite some stronger performances, the results highlight several persistent gaps in global climate governance. Many countries continue to record high emissions levels while making only partial progress toward net-zero commitments. At the same time, financial contributions to international climate funds remain concentrated among a relatively small number of countries. Gender integration in climate policy also remains uneven. While many countries now reference gender equality in their climate strategies, fewer adopt transformative approaches that recognize women as agents of change or prioritize women’s leadership in climate governance.

These findings underscore the need for stronger climate mitigation commitments, more equitable climate finance, and deeper integration of gender equality into climate governance frameworks.

Case Study: Spain

Spain has made notable progress in reducing greenhouse gas emissions while expanding renewable energy. Carbon dioxide emissions per capita declined from about 8.5 metric tons in 2005 to around 4.6 metric tons in 2023, reflecting improvements in energy efficiency and a shift toward cleaner energy sources (International Energy Agency, n.d.; Real Instituto Elcano, 2024).

A key driver of this reduction is the rapid expansion of renewable electricity. In 2023, renewable energy accounted for more than 50% of Spain’s electricity generation, led primarily by wind and solar power (Red Eléctrica de España, 2024, p. 1). This transition has helped reduce emissions from the power sector and supports Spain’s broader climate goals.

Spain’s National Energy and Climate Plan 2023–2030 aims to further accelerate decarbonization, targeting a 32% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels and a large increase in renewable electricity capacity (European Commission, 2024, p. 3). Continued progress in renewable deployment, grid infrastructure, and energy efficiency will be essential for meeting these targets and sustaining reductions in emissions per capita (Enerdata, 2024).

Recommendations: Climate Governance

For Policymakers

Ensure that gender references in NDCs and net-zero frameworks are tied to funded measures, clear responsibilities across ministries, and public reporting, so gender is not treated as a symbolic add-on but as part of delivery.

For Advocates

Focus advocacy efforts on funding and implementation for commitments, and ensure this is reflected in actual mitigation, adaptation, and just transition policies.

Recommendations: Climate Governance

For Policymakers

Uphold the principle that developed countries bear primary responsibility for climate finance, while encouraging all countries in a position to do so to contribute—financially, technically, or politically—to collective climate action and to relevant financial mechanisms, including the Green Climate Fund.


Move beyond counting women in delegations by supporting women’s access to senior negotiating roles, head-of-delegation positions, and technical leadership across finance, mitigation, and adaptation tracks.


For Advocates

Defend differentiated responsibilities while also making the pragmatic case that all countries should contribute what they can, especially where doing so can strengthen political legitimacy and collective momentum without diluting historical responsibility.

Push United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change actors and national governments to improve gender balance in delegations and in leadership and power. Find opportunities for women delegates—and specifically younger women—to speak, lead, and shape negotiating positions.

Overall Rankings



0  0.789

The 2026 Index results show both continuity and notable shifts compared to the 2023 FFP Index. Sweden remains at the top, with Mexico and Germany in the top five. South Africa has dropped out of the top 10, going from 8th to 26th. South Africa's drop is likely primarily driven by a change in evaluation criteria: the 2026 Index assessed

substantive written inputs to the Third Session of United Nations Tax Convention negotiations rather than votes, and South Africa did not submit inputs. This drop is compounded by South Africa's lack of sign on to the Buenos Aires Declaration, the lack of development of a National Action Plan for Business and Human Rights, and its decline in

women's parliamentary representation.

Among other significant movers, Lithuania and Latvia fell 20 (25 to 45) and 21 (27 to 48) places, respectively, driven by withdrawal from the Landmine Treaty, declining women's representation, and very low ODA. More broadly, falls across the Index were concentrated in two areas: declining women's parliamentary representation and weakening climate commitments. Rises were driven primarily by strong climate performance and strong or growing ODA.

The two most systemic drivers of change are the climate score—countries lacking net-zero pledges or with lapsed GCF contributions score near zero—and the United Nations Tax Convention indicator shift, which moved credit from voting in favor to making substantive written inputs.

The Nordic countries present a mixed picture. Sweden holds the top position, and Norway remains in the top five, while Denmark and Iceland appear in the top third but have fallen from their 2023 positions. Among countries with declared FFPs, performance varies considerably—some have improved their rankings, while others have fallen. This is partly a reflection of what FFP frameworks tend to prioritize—diplomacy, representation, and development cooperation—and what they often leave underaddressed: the structural drivers of gender inequality embedded in trade, taxation, investment, militarization, and migration governance. When evaluated across these broader domains, FFP countries do not show up as consistently strong performers, suggesting that the current scope of most FFP frameworks does not yet extend to the full range of policy arenas.

Rankings: Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality	
Country	GEFP Score
Sweden	0.7890
Germany	0.6533
Norway	0.6211
Mexico	0.6206
Netherlands	0.6160
Chile	0.5980
United Kingdom	0.5943
Costa Rica	0.5742
Argentina	0.5688
Switzerland	0.5633

More striking is the pattern among countries that have rescinded their FFP frameworks: Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands rank among the top five, and Argentina holds its top 10 position despite rolling back gender equality commitments domestically, though this may shift in future iterations. Where countries like these continue to score highly, it likely reflects institutional legacy—formal policy architectures and reporting practices that remain visible and measurable even as political ambition weakens. It also reflects a broader methodological reality: indices tend to capture codified commitment more readily than they capture erosion, contradiction, or failure to challenge deeper structural inequalities.

The bottom third is anchored by countries tied for last place, and **notably, their scores are getting worse**, with the gap between their foreign policy behavior and the demands of gender equality widening. Three of the world's largest economies, the United States, India, and China, rank among the poorest performers. In the case of the United States, this ranking reflects performance during a presidency comparatively vocal in its support for gender equality. That the United States ranks this poorly even under those conditions

reinforces a central finding: stated commitments have limited bearing on where countries actually stand in diplomatic and global engagement. Regional clustering is also evident, with Central and Eastern European countries concentrated in the lower tertile. Finally, small score differences in the middle of the distribution can produce minor ranking variations; these should be read as indicative groupings rather than precise hierarchies.

Overall, the analysis reveals persistent gaps between commitment and practice across policy domains. This is most visible in the peace and militarization priority area, where countries continue to endorse international norms while maintaining military spending and arms export practices that may undermine them, suggesting that for some governments, engagement with gender equality norms functions as diplomatic signaling rather than a driver of policy coherence. Differences in performance are shaped less by foundational commitments, which are widely ratified, and more by the adoption and operationalization of newer policy frameworks where variation remains meaningful.

Concluding Recommendations

The Index's findings point to a common strategic imperative: gender equality efforts must move beyond declarations and engage more directly with the arenas where power, resources, and accountability are negotiated. This means working across sectors to identify the live processes shaping outcomes on peace and militarization, development finance, labor, migration, economic governance, political representation, and climate justice. It also means building coordinated strategies to influence these processes. Rather than treating gender equality as a parallel or downstream concern, policymakers and advocates alike should position it as a measure of whether these wider negotiations are redistributing power, expanding rights, and protecting the material conditions needed for justice.

Closing these gaps will require more than technical fixes to individual policy areas. It means a more deliberate use of the frameworks that already exist, linking formal commitments to budgets, enforcement mechanisms, and decision-making authority rather than treating ratifications or declarations as endpoints. The following recommendations are directed at governments, advocates, and monitoring bodies working to translate commitment into measurable change.

1. **Close the rhetoric-to-resources gap on gender-targeted funding.**

Public commitments to gender equality have not translated into measurable changes in how aid is allocated. In a period where conditions are actively deteriorating across the lowest-ranked countries, protecting and increasing gender-targeted funding is not a preventive

measure but an urgent corrective one. Governments should:

- Establish binding targets for gender-targeted ODA with transparent reporting mechanisms;
- Prioritize direct funding to women's rights organizations, which currently receive just 0.1% of total ODA globally; and
- Ring-fence gender equality programming from broader aid cuts, recognizing that it is consistently among the first areas reduced when overall aid budgets shrink.

2. **Strengthen accountability to and implementation of—not just ratification of—international labor, migration, and security commitments and frameworks.**

The Index reveals a persistent gap between what countries declare and their actions across diplomacy, trade, tax, aid, and security. For example, ratification of core ILO conventions is high, yet union density is falling, and workplace protections remain unevenly enforced. Strong performance in one area does not predict strong performance across the board, and accountability mechanisms must reflect that breadth. Governments, advocates, and monitoring bodies should:

- Move Women, Peace, and Security plans from declaration to funded, monitored implementation, with dedicated budgets and substantive security analysis;
- Move beyond single-issue assessments and evaluate foreign policy as a unified

posture—a country’s position on the United Nations Tax Convention, its arms export practices, its financial secrecy score, and its gender-targeted aid should all be legible together;

- Link existing frameworks, treaties, action plans, and reporting mechanisms to enforcement mechanisms, budgets, and decision-making authority rather than treating them as endpoints;
- Link labor inspection, corporate accountability, and migrant protections to existing trade and investment frameworks;
- Strengthen cross-governmental coordination so that gender equality commitments made in one domain do not contradict decisions made in another; and
- Prioritize ratification of ILO Conventions No. 190, No. 189, and No. 97, especially No. 189 and No. 97, which remain critically underrated despite the central role migrant women play in global care economies.

3. **Go beyond defending frameworks—use them more strategically.**

Across trade, tax, and investment indicators, gender equality is largely absent from countries’ multilateral behavior. Only two countries included substantive gender language in United Nations Tax Convention inputs, and most National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights make no meaningful connection to gender equality—including those from countries with explicit gender equality commitments. Governments should:

- Conduct gender impact assessments

of trade agreements and investment frameworks, and align multilateral economic positions with stated gender commitments;

- Strengthen financial transparency measures that directly affect the fiscal space available for gender-responsive public services;
- Review participation in investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, which continue to concentrate power among investors from higher-income economies and constrain the policy space of lower-income countries to enact gender-responsive regulation; and
- Use existing normative frameworks as entry points toward stronger binding standards, rather than treating voluntary endorsement as sufficient.

4. **Address the militarization trend and redirect resources toward human security.**

Military expenditure is rising across the Index, while ODA and social investments are falling—a structural tradeoff with direct consequences for gender equality. A small number of major arms exporters drive disproportionate global militarization, and high military spending consistently correlates with weaker gender equality outcomes. The trajectory revealed by this Index—rising defense budgets alongside declining investment in human security and worsening scores among the lowest-ranked countries—makes this redirection not merely desirable but necessary. Governments should:

- Recommit to international disarmament frameworks and strengthen arms export controls;

- Explicitly account for the gender impacts of military spending in foreign and fiscal policy decisions; and
- Redirect resources from defense budgets toward human security investments, including ODA, social protection, and climate finance.

5. **Build cross-sectoral coalitions beyond existing gender equality networks.**

Effective strategies will require stronger alignment between feminist actors and those working on tax justice, debt, labor rights, migrant rights, climate justice, peace and disarmament, and democratic reform. The next phase of work should be less organized around issue silos and more around the systems of power that reproduce inequality across them. This means advocates should:

- Broaden who is seen as part of the gender equality agenda and work with actors who may not use feminist language explicitly but are committed to accountability and structural reform;
- Invest in cross-movement coordination that connects gender equality advocacy to live negotiations on tax, trade, climate, and security; and
- Build shared accountability frameworks that hold governments to coherent standards across domains rather than allowing strong performance in one area to obscure failures in another.

6. **Invest in better tools for measuring what actually changes.**

This Index's limitations reflect a broader

challenge: available indicators capture formal commitment more readily than implementation, erosion, or lived outcomes. Moving the field forward requires investing in the next generation of monitoring tools. Research bodies, funders, and governments should:

- Develop behavioral and implementation-sensitive indicators that can capture whether commitments are funded, enforced, and translated into material change;
- Invest in power-sensitive measures that go beyond numerical representation to assess who holds senior roles, shapes agendas, and exercises real authority; and
- Support data collection that captures structural forces—debt, care work, informal labor, and climate displacement—that current cross-country datasets do not yet reflect.

The Index points to the need for a more deliberate form of pragmatism. In the current political context, pragmatism cannot mean retreating to the least controversial agenda or treating symbolic gains as sufficient. It should mean identifying where real leverage exists: where existing frameworks can be reinforced across processes, where implementation gaps can be politicized, where softer instruments can be used as entry points toward stronger standards, and where resources and attention can be redirected toward institutions, movements, and public systems capable of sustaining change. The strategic challenge ahead is, therefore, to intervene more coherently in the processes that matter most so that gender equality is anchored not only in language and aspiration, but in the rules, financing, and shifts in power needed to advance it.

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Appendix

Pillar	Description	Updates (2026)	Indicators	Notes	Source
Peace and Militarization	Measures the extent to which countries contribute to or mitigate global militarization and peace through defense spending, arms transfers, and participation in disarmament and arms control frameworks.	Data updated for most recent available for all indicators. The social-to-military spending ratio indicator was removed due to data limitations. For all other indicators, last available data or imputations were done to address missing values.	Arms exports, sum 2014-2024, MN of SIPRI trend indicator values	A '0' indicates that the volume of deliveries is between 0 and 0.5 million SIPRI TIV. An empty field indicates that no deliveries have been identified.	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (n.d.). SIPRI arms transfers database. →
			Military expenditure per capita, average 2014-2024	USD\$ million, in current prices, converted at the exchange rate for the given year.	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (n.d.). SIPRI military expenditure database. →
			Normative framework sum:		United Nations Treaty Collection. (n.d.). Arms trade treaty [Treaty details, XXVI-5]. →
			1) Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)		United Nations Treaty Collection. (n.d.). Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction [Treaty details]. →
			2) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction	Coding: 0 = No signature or ratification 0.5 = Signature 1 = State parties (accession or ratification)	United Nations Treaty Collection. (n.d.). Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime [Treaty details, XVIII-12-c]. →
			3) Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime		United Nations Treaty Collection. (n.d.). Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons [Treaty details, XXVI-9]. →
			4) Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons		United Nations Treaty Collection. (n.d.). Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons [Treaty details, XXVI-9]. →
National Action Plans (NAPs) on UNSCR 1325	Coding: 0 = No NAP 0.25 = NAP without budget or internal analysis 0.5 = NAP with budget or internal analysis 1 = NAP with budget AND internal analysis	WPS Focal Points Network. (n.d.). Resources. →			
Official Development Assistance (ODA)	Assesses countries' financial contributions to development, including overall ODA levels and the extent to which aid targets gender equality objectives.	Data updated for most recent available for all indicators. Two-step aggregation retained to account for DAC and non-DAC countries.	Net ODA as percent of GNI, grant equivalent	Average 2018-2024, current prices	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (n.d.b). Net ODA. →
			Gender Equality: Aid (ODA) activities in support of gender equality and women's empowerment - Total aid with gender as a significant or principal goal	Average 2014-2024, US dollar, Millions, Constant prices	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (n.d.). Gender-disaggregated ODA data explorer [Dataset]. OECD Data Explorer. →
			Funding for Sector Code 15170 "Women's rights organizations and movements, and government institutions"	Average 2014-2024, US dollar, Millions, Constant prices	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (n.d.). Gender-disaggregated ODA data explorer [Dataset]. OECD Data Explorer →

Pillar	Description	Updates (2026)	Indicators	Notes	Source
Migration for Employment	Evaluates policies and frameworks governing migrant integration and labor mobility, including protections for migrant workers.	Data updated for most recent available for all indicators. Last available data or imputations done to address missing values.	Migrant Integration Policy Index 2025	MIPEX country score: Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) measures policies to integrate migrants in countries across six continents and for eight policy areas.	Migrant Integration Policy Index. (2025). MIPEX 2025. →
			ILO, Domestic Workers Convention No.189, 2011	Coding Not signed = 0 signed but not in force = 0.5 in force = 1	International Labour Organization. (2011). Domestic workers convention, 2011 (No. 189) [Normlex]. →
			ILO Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) No. 97, 1949	International Labour Organization. (1949). Migration for employment convention (revised), 1949 (No. 97) [Normlex]. →	
Labor Protections	Captures commitment to international labor standards, including freedom of association, collective bargaining, and protections against workplace violence.	ILO convention ratifications largely unchanged, with minor updates reflecting recent country-level changes.	Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87)	Coding Not signed = 0 signed but not in force = 0.5 in force = 1	International Labour Organization. (1948). Freedom of association and protection of the right to organise convention, 1948 (No. 87) [Normlex]. →
			Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)		International Labour Organization. (1949). Right to organise and collective bargaining convention, 1949 (No. 98) [Normlex]. →
			Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190)		International Labour Organization. (2019). Violence and harassment convention, 2019 (No. 190) [Normlex]. →
Economic Justice	Examines structural economic policies, including financial transparency, tax governance, and participation in global economic rule-making processes.	Data updated for most recent available for all indicators. UN Tax Convention voting indicator replaced with third session inputs to reflect most recent changes.	Financial Secrecy Index 2025	Country FSI value: the Financial Secrecy Index is a ranking of jurisdictions most complicit in helping individuals to hide their finances from the rule of law.	Tax Justice Network. (n.d.). Financial secrecy index. →
			Investment Dispute Settlements	Number of cases as home state of claimant	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (n.d.). Investment dispute settlement navigator. →
			Third session written inputs	Examined countries' written inputs to the Third Session of United Nations Tax Convention negotiations for incorporating gender equality considerations	Tax Justice Network. (n.d.). UN tax convention – «Who wants what?» database. →
			Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women's Economic Empowerment	Coding: Not endorsed = 0 Endorsed = 1	World Trade Organization. (n.d.). Buenos Aires declaration on trade and women's economic empowerment. →
			National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights	To support implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Coding: No plan = 0, Nonstate initiatives or mentions to responsible business conduct broader human rights action plans = 1, developing a NAP = 2, NAP in place = 3	Danish Institute for Human Rights & Global NAPs. (n.d.). National action plans on women, peace and security – Country profiles. →

Pillar	Description	Updates (2026)	Indicators	Notes	Source
Institutional Commitments to Gender Equality	Measures formal commitments to gender equality through international agreements and representation of women in political institutions.	Updated data on women's representation in parliament and ministerial positions. Treaty ratification data (e.g., CEDAW) unchanged.	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)	Coding: Not ratified = 0, Signature, or ratification with reservations = 0.5, Ratification, Accession, Succession = 1	United Nations Treaty Collection. (n.d.). Optional protocol to the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women [Treaty details, IV-8]. →
			Proportion of women in ministerial level positions	2024, %	World Bank. (n.d.). Gender data portal: Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments [Dataset]. →
			Proportion of seats held in national parliaments by women (%)	2024, %	UN Women. (2025, March). Women in politics 2025 [Infographic]. →
Climate	Assesses countries' contributions to climate crisis mitigation and governance, including emissions, participation, and gender responsiveness in climate policy.	Data updated for most recent available for all indicators.	Global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions per unit of GDP	Average 2014-2024, tonnes	Climate Watch. (n.d.). GHG emissions data explorer – Per capita emissions [Dataset]. World Resources Institute. →
			Women's participation in climate party delegations.	Average 2014-2025, percentage (excluding 2020 since there was no data to report that year). The percentage of women party delegates per meeting is calculated by dividing the total number of women delegates by the total number of delegates.	Gender Climate Tracker. (n.d.). Women's participation in party delegations. →
			Contributions to the Green Climate Fund	Announced per capita, US Dollar	Green Climate Fund. (n.d.). GCF-2: Resource mobilisation. →
			Gender Sensitive NDC: Evaluation of the extent to which countries address women's human rights and the linkages between climate change and gender in their latest submitted National Determined Contributions (NDCs).	Coding: No reference to gender equality = 0, Sensitive or Responsive = 0.25, Sensitive or Responsive and also recognizing women as vulnerable group = 0.5, Gender-Transformative = 0.75, Recognizing women as agents of change = 1	Gender Climate Tracker. (n.d.). Country profiles. →
			Net zero pledges: Net-zero targets that have been communicated in a party's NDC, long-term low greenhouse gas emissions development strategy, domestic law, policy, or high-level political pledge such as head of state commitment.	Coding: None=0, In political pledge = 0.25, In policy = 0.50, Combination of in political pledge and in policy= 0.75 In law = 1	Climate Watch. (n.d.). Net-zero tracker [Dataset]. World Resources Institute. →